General · inspect by default

/security

Examine concrete security risks in a defined scope

Use for a scoped security review; security-* commands investigate one specific attack surface, and security-fix repairs confirmed findings.

Make it your own.

In Claude Code, use the slash command and add your context. In Codex, select security from the just-vibe skill picker, then send the same brief.

Version 0.11.0 also supports /jv security, /just-vibe security and /jv:security in Claude. See shortcut setup and context examples.

Example · inspect
/just-vibe:security Audit authorization around invoice exports using source evidence only.
edge · inspect
/just-vibe:security Audit an export endpoint with tenant filtering and an alternate download route.
blocked · inspect
/just-vibe:security Review source only without probing real accounts or using suspected credentials.

What the agent does

  1. Identify the requested scope, assets, entry points, trust boundaries and available source/runtime evidence. Read the security methods and review selector, then the matching vulnerability and framework sections.
  2. Trace each relevant attacker-controlled source through transformations and existing controls to the sensitive effect. Challenge suspected findings with legitimate controls; use available scanners according to their evidence procedure and keep unknown or skipped coverage explicit.

Inputs

  • application boundary, threat concerns, and authorized environment.

Optional context: scope, references, constraints, successCriteria, environment, mode, budget.

Scope

Reads
Concrete security risks in the specified system; no intrusive remote scanning or automatic remediation.
Writes
No source changes in inspect/plan. Save only requested planning artifacts. A separately requested repair uses the relevant implementation workflow.
Mode
Inspect; application boundary, threat concerns, and authorized environment.
Prerequisites
Resolve the user brief and inspect the relevant project or supplied evidence. External capabilities are optional unless the selected action actually needs them.

Expected output

  • Findings with attacker prerequisites, reachable path, evidence, impact and remediation options.

How the work is checked

  • A reachable authorization gap is explained; a suspicious function with effective protections is not automatically labeled vulnerable.

When to stop or clarify

  • Do not expose secrets or user records as proof. Missing environment access narrows confidence and coverage.

Handling missing context

Infer
Resolve the named files, existing scripts, current task and earlier corrections from the conversation and repository.
Assume
Use the narrowest interpretation that completes a reversible local task; state a consequential assumption once.
Ask
Ask when competing targets or incompatible success conditions would change the result; continue independent inspection first.

Technical guidance

Evidence
Identify scoped assets, attacker-controlled entry points, deployed assumptions and existing trust controls.
Method
Read the security review selector, relevant vulnerability cards and matching framework defaults before tracing source to sensitive effect.
Pitfall
A suspicious API or generic checklist entry is not proof of exploitability; unseen deployment defenses remain unknown.
Check
For each finding establish prerequisites, reachable path, missing control and impact, plus a safe rejection/legitimate-control check where feasible.

Situational decisions

When suspicious code is protected by an earlier verified boundary: Explain the effective protection and avoid a confirmed-vulnerability label.

The coding agent follows this workflow using its available tools. Installation does not grant service access or guarantee an outcome. Read the compatibility notes.

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